Just five years ago, macroeconomists talked about a new synthesis, bringing together Keynesian and Classical ideas in a unified, microfounded theoretical framework. Following the Great Recession, it appears that mainstream macroeconomics has once again split into schools of thought. This column explains why macroeconomics, unlike microeconomics, periodically fragments in this way.

What does it mean to be a ‘Keynesian’? This column argues that, like so much in economics, the label has become politicised. The cost is an impoverished policy debate that is resulting in millions of avoidable job cuts.

Europe’s new fiscal compact is seen by some as the death of Keynesian government spending. This column argues that such analysis is simply wrong. It says that there is still room for government spending in extreme situations, but that there are now more safeguards to maintain stability, reduce contagion, and placate German taxpayers.

Many analysts blame Germany’s fiscal prudence for worsening the crisis. This essay argues that the monomaniacal focus on aggregate demand is based on slightly outdated and oversimplified Keynesianism. The real constraint on European growth is not Germany’s fiscal policy. It is the supply side rigidities that plague all European nations – especially those at the heart of this crisis. The demand side matters, but is it foolish to think that German budget deficit of 5% instead of 3% of GDP would solve Europe’s problems.

Most policymakers subscribe to the existence of a natural rate of unemployment. This column provides a visual history of unemployment, vacancies, and inflation in the US and says there is no natural rate. It suggests the economy can rest in any equilibrium on the Beveridge curve, as decided by the confidence of households and firms that pins down asset values.