True independence for the ECB: Triggering power - no more, no less
Markus K Brunnermeier, Hans Gersbach, 20 December 2012
As governments and the EU wring their hands over banking reform, a fragile system remains in place. This column argues that the ECB’s current role undermines its independence. What the Eurozone needs to reduce undue forbearance - while preserving the ECB's independence - is a ‘diarchy’ in which both a newly built Restructuring Authority and the ECB have the power to trigger bank-restructuring.
Governments are hesitating over how to resolve the financial distress of banks, leaving fragile banking structures in place. This problem is particularly pressing in the Eurozone; governments expect the ECB to continue providing cheap funding, undermining the bank’s independence.
Ever since the recent mortgage crisis, calls for tighter regulation on lenders have been widespread. But would stricter supervision and regulation of lenders have been any use during the frenzied optimism of a boom? This column argues that it might. It shows that lending by the loosely regulated non-bank companies was associated with higher foreclosure during the housing downturn when compared with lending by the more tightly regulated banks.
The far-reaching consequences of the US mortgage crisis have sent economists and policymakers searching for a better understanding of the roots of the housing bubble.
Banking union instead of Eurobonds – disentangling sovereign and banking crises
Thorsten Beck, Daniel Gros, Dirk Schoenmaker, 24 June 2012
After more than two years of efforts and innumerable emergency summits, the Eurozone crisis shows now signs of responding to treatment. This column argues that solving the Eurozone crisis requires policies that separate the banking and sovereign facets of the crisis. The losses incurred by Europe’s banks must be swiftly recognised by establishing a European Resolution Authority to identify weak banks and fix or liquidate them. Such an institution needs a fiscal backstop and the ESM should provide one. But this would not create Eurobonds – the very need for Eurobonds might to some extent disappear with a strong banking union.
Most observers have realised by now that a core problem of the Eurozone crisis is the close interconnection between banking and sovereign fragility (Gros 2010). Unfortunately, recent policy actions have exacerbated this interconnection.
Excessive risk-taking by large banks was among the main causes of the 2008–09 financial crisis. This column argues that the antidote to excessive risk-taking should come from the elimination of the subsidies of the banking charter and the implicit promise of bailout in case of major losses, and the introduction of strong incentives for management and shareholders to preserve the capital of their bank. This requires deep changes in Basel prudential rules.
Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were among the main causes of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. Enormous costs were borne by taxpayers and societies at large.
How to solve the crisis – and what to do about banks
Thorsten Beck interviewed by Viv Davies, 28 Oct 2011
Thorsten Beck talks to Viv Davies about the recently published Vox eBook on ‘The Future of Banking’ – a collection of essays by leading European and US economists that provide solutions to the current financial crisis and proposals for medium- to long-term regulatory reforms. The authors call for a forceful resolution to the current crisis in the Eurozone, better incentives for banks to internalize risk and a more credible resolution regime. The interview was recorded on 27 October 2011. [Also read the transcript]