By the end of the 1990s, under the incentive of Eurozone entry, most peripheral European countries were busy undertaking structural reforms and putting their fiscal houses in order. This column argues that the arrival of the euro, and the subsequent interest-rate convergence, loosened a tide of cheap money that reversed the incentives for further reforms. As a result, by the end of the euro’s first decade, the institutions and governance in the Eurozone periphery were in worse shape than they were at the start of the decade.

Why is it that large movements in exchange rates have small effects on international prices? What does this mean for a crisis-stricken Eurozone? Using firm-level data, this column presents new research that investigates this exchange rate ‘disconnect’. Evidence suggests that the prices of the largest firms – with their disproportionately large share of trade – are insulated from exchange rate movements. The international competitiveness effects of a euro devaluation are therefore likely to be modest, given major exporters’ reliance on global supply chains.

All G7 economies are struggling in the post-crisis climate, but US GDP has recovered to pre-crisis levels, while the Eurozone simply hasn’t. This column portrays the global crisis as a transitory shock for the US, but as a quasi-permanent shock for Europe. The policies that are needed get the Eurozone back on track do not seem to be politically feasible. As tension rises with every quarter of stagnation, prospects for the survival of the euro are not only not improving, they are actually getting worse.

The Eurozone crisis has meant slow growth, rising unemployment, and social unrest. This column gauges the impact of all this on European citizens‘ opinions about the euro and EU institutions. Using Eurobarometer surveys, the authors find that, within the Eurozone, the crisis has only marginally lowered support for the euro but has led to a sharp fall in public trust in the ECB.

If Italy is too big to fail and too big to save, how can it save itself? This column suggests a survival strategy. The Italian households should finance their own government by buying its debt, and the ECB should prevent a collapse of the Italian banking system.

Another week, another set of crisis talks over the future of the euro. This column argues that the currency’s problem is one of incentives. It says that interventions since early 2010 have been completely ineffective and that most current proposals to foster budget discipline will fare no better. It calls for new decision-making mechanisms as a matter of urgency.

The Eurozone has been swept up in turmoil that has ranged from stock and bond markets to exchange rates, government spending, and tax rates. Marco Pagano, Professor at the University of Naples Federico II and CEPR Research Fellow, explains events, how they hang together, and what needs to be done. This challenge facing Europe could be a historical turning point.

As world markets continue to raise concerns about Eurozone countries, this column argues that the euro has been a failure. Why should money be poured into Greece to "save the euro"? Besides the moral hazard effects of the intervention, it makes little sense to prolong a monetary regime which is actually one of the reasons why these Eurozone countries are in trouble.

Is the dollar still the dominant international currency? This column argues that the answer is “yes”. The dollar is used as a major form of cash currency, and is the main currency for exchange rate pegs and for invoicing foreign transactions. Network externalities create inertia – everyone uses the dollar because everyone else is using the dollar.

Will the dollar lose its dominant role in international transactions? This column argues that this will happen quite slowly, if at all. It presents new evidence that in developing economies, demand for dollars hinges much more on historical factors than on recent experience. The highest inflation rate recorded within a country over the past 30 years explains flows of cash dollars more compellingly than recent inflation rates.