financial crisis

European banks: Distinguishing the walking wounded from the living dead

Max Bruche   Gerard Llobet
9 August 2010

Bank bailouts have been controversial from the outset, with some commentators saying that they reward banks for making risky loans. This column investigates the idea of an asset buyback in which a special purpose vehicle buys bad loans from banks' balance sheets. It argues that these buybacks could be structured to avoid windfall gains.


As a consequence of the global crisis, there are worries that many countries will slide into a Japanese-style decade of lost growth.


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Max Bruche
Assistant Professor of Economics, CEMFI


Gerard Llobet
Associate Professor of Economics, CEMFI


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Employment protection legislation and the financial crisis

Marco Leonardi   Julián Messina   Giovanni Pica
4 March 2010

How do financial crises alter the effects of employment protection legislation? This column argues that firms with insufficient access to credit are even less able to rationalise their costs by switching from labour to capital – reinforcing the negative effects on productivity. But policymakers should also consider that, in countries with less-developed financial markets, employment protection provides insurance against labour-market risk.


A large literature has established that employment protection legislation affects job flows by reducing both workers’ hiring and firing, its effects being stronger during downturns and in declining sectors (see for example a discussion on this site Koeniger and Prat 2007).


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Marco Leonardi
Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Milan


Julián Messina
Senior Economist, Office of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank


Giovanni Pica
Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Salerno


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Against a separate resolution fund

Dirk Schoenmaker
14 January 2010

There are calls to establish a separate resolution fund to deal with future financial crises. This column says such a fund is not desirable. It likely would be procyclical, counterproductive, and give a false sense of safety. Rather, governments should levy Pigouvian taxes on the financial system to address negative externalities.


The 2007-2009 financial crisis was resolved through massive government support across the world. Calls are now being made to establish a separate resolution fund to deal with future financial crises (HM Treasury, 2009). Such a programme would be funded by premia levied on the financial sector. The question is whether such a separate resolution fund should be established. I would argue not.


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Dirk Schoenmaker
Dean of the Duisenberg School of Finance and Professor of Finance, Banking and Insurance at the VU University Amsterdam


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The financial crisis and the structure of contracts

Charles A.E. Goodhart
17 December 2009

The structure of contracts in financial markets is deeply rooted in history. This column retraces the origins of financial contracting and explains why mutual fund banking proposals are wrong headed. It proposes to shift more of the functions of our current banking system away from limited liability back into partnerships. This would involve requiring hedge funds to be entirely separated from banks.


Economists often have a hard time understanding the reason why both wages and many financial contracts – such as bank loans and bank deposits – are fixed for certain periods of time in nominal terms.


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Charles A.E. Goodhart
Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London School of Economics


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How credit conditions will shape the economic recovery

Prakash Kannan
19 November 2009

Will the economic recovery be U-, V-, W-, or L-shaped? This column warns that recoveries from recessions caused by financial crises are slower than others, due to stressed credit conditions that persist even after output begins to recover. It thus recommends policies aimed at recapitalising financial institutions, resolving distressed financial assets, ensuring adequate provision of liquidity, and expediting bankruptcy proceedings.


The prospects for recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis appear to be on the horizon.


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Prakash Kannan
Economist at the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund


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Liquidity Risk Charges as a Macroprudential Tool

Enrico Perotti   Javier Suarez
7 November 2009

Liquidity risk charges were proposed in February 2009 as a new macro-prudential tool to discourage systemic risk creation by banks. CEPR Policy Insight No. 40 refines this proposal in order to clarify challenging issues surrounding the implementation of liquidity risk charges.


Download CEPR Policy Insight No. 40 from the CEPR website here.


 


Enrico Perotti
Professor of International Finance, Amsterdam Business School and CEPR Research Fellow.


Javier Suarez
Professor of Finance at CEMFI, Madrid and CEPR Research Fellow



Fiscal stimulus for debt-intolerant countries

Carmen M. Reinhart   Vincent Reinhart
22 August 2009

Developed economies are implementing massive fiscal stimulus packages. Should emerging economies? This column warns them that fiscal multipliers are not certain, financing budget deficits will not be easy, the risk of default looms, and central bank independence may be eroded.


What began as the subprime crisis in the US during the summer of 2007 and morphed into a global financial crisis in the other advanced economies of the “North” has led to unprecedented fiscal stimulus efforts worldwide.


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Carmen M. Reinhart
Professor of Economics, University of Maryland; former VP at Bear Stearns, and former Deputy Director at IMF Research Department


Vincent Reinhart
Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute


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Simple explanations for global financial instability

Jacopo Carmassi   Daniel Gros   Stefano Micossi
13 August 2009

Why is there so much disagreement about the causes of the crisis? This column says that lax monetary policy and excessive leverage are to blame. It argues that many alleged causes are simply symptoms of these policy errors. If that is correct, then the recommended corrective is remarkably simple – there is no need for intrusive regulatory measures constraining non-bank intermediaries and innovative financial instruments.


A remarkable feature of the burgeoning literature on the global financial crisis is vast disagreement about its main causes. Symptoms are often treated as autonomous developments requiring separate correction. There is thus a high risk that the legitimate pursuit of a more stable financial system will lead to a potpourri of excessive and damaging regulatory restrictions.


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Jacopo Carmassi
Researcher at Assonime and Fellow of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center


Daniel Gros
Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels


Stefano Micossi
Director General of Assonime


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Will they sing the same tune? Measuring convergence in the new European system of financial supervisors

Donato Masciandaro   María J. Nieto   Marc Quintyn
11 August 2009

The impact of the current financial crisis on EU members has introduced a sense of urgency to the coordination/centralization of financial supervision debate. This CEPR Policy Insight on the micro-prudential supervisory framework.



 


Donato Masciandaro
Professor of Economics, Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation at Bocconi University, Head of the Department of Economics and Director of the Paolo Baffi Centre on Central Banking and Financial Regulation.


María J. Nieto
Advisor to the Director General of Banking Regulation, Banco de España


Marc Quintyn
Division Chief, Africa, at the IMF Institute



Measuring convergence in the new European system of financial supervisors

Donato Masciandaro   María J. Nieto   Marc Quintyn
11 August 2009

The financial crisis introduced a sense of urgency to the debate on the desirable structure of financial supervision in the EU. This column, which accompanies a new CEPR Policy Insight, provides two policy recommendations. First, policymakers could consider the harmonisation of supervisors´ governance arrangements. Second, consideration should be given to the introduction of a European mandate for national supervisors in order to better align incentives in the EU supervisory framework for micro-prudential supervision.


The current financial crisis introduced a sense of urgency to the debate on the desirable structure of financial supervision in the EU, but the adopted new framework does not resolve all the tensions in the coordination/centralisation debate.


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Donato Masciandaro
Professor of Economics, Chair in Economics of Financial Regulation at Bocconi University, Head of the Department of Economics and Director of the Paolo Baffi Centre on Central Banking and Financial Regulation.


María J. Nieto
Advisor to the Director General of Banking Regulation, Banco de España


Marc Quintyn
Division Chief, Africa, at the IMF Institute


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